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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose the experimental construction of a new
attacker typology grounded in real-life data, using grounded the-
ory analysis and over 200 publicly available documents containing
details of digital banking related cybercrime and involved attackers.
The current state of this research area is introduced briey, high-
lighting current issues and shortcomings. This is supported by a
brief investigation into the mechanisms of the construction of pre-
vious taxonomies and typologies. Eight attacker proles forming
the typology specic to the case of digital banking are presented. A
short discussion of contributions made and suggestions for future
research directions in this eld are also added.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Web application security; Human and
societal aspects of security and privacy;
KEYWORDS
attackers, threat agents, categorisation, typology, taxonomy, threat
modelling, grounded theory, digital banking
ACM Reference format:
Caroline Moeckel. 2019. Examining and Constructing Attacker Categorisa-
tions — an Experimental Typology for Digital Banking. In Proceedings of
14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES
2019), Canterbury, United Kingdom, August 26–29, 2019 (ARES ’19), 7 pages.
DOI: 10.1145/3339252.3340341
1 INTRODUCTION
Attacker analysis and proling have long been part of the ana-
lytical toolkit of investigators and date back centuries [19], both
for planning defence strategies and to aid forensics post-attack.
Researchers have been interested in nding out more about the
individuals behind cybercrime since the rst illegal activities were
observed in the early beginnings of the cyber era, initially in the
area of telecommunications. In this context, attacker typologies
and taxonomies are commonly used vehicles to represent attacker
types and categories applicable to either a specic system or for
generic usage.
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Early research in this area (e.g. [11][16][9][21]), mostly based on
relatively small numbers of interviews, documented case studies
and anecdotes, indicated variations amongst attackers, for exam-
ple their technical skills, motives or level of damage done to the
system targeted. Such observations ultimately lead to the creation
of attacker categories, e.g. like the three types of computer crimi-
nals (crackers, criminals, and vandals) identied by the FBI in 1997
[14]. More recent works include the widely referenced work by
[24] from 2006, with nine attacker types and a two-dimensional
matrix visualisation aligning attacker motivations and resources.
Based on a literature analysis of previous works on attacker tax-
onomies, individual hacker categories and subcategories, [18] in
2009 then consolidated research eorts to date into eight common
categories of attackers. In 2012, [10] carefully updated known at-
tacker categories, using current terminology and threat properties.
More recently, in 2015, [25] proposed an updated attacker typology.
While closely built on the mentioned earlier works, it has been
adapted with the intent to capture “the recent increases in ideologi-
cally and socially motivated hacking”. A comprehensive and critical
assessment of the state of attacker typologies and taxonomies can
also be found in the 2017 work by [7].
While they certainly provide interesting and accessible visuali-
sations of human threat actor landscapes, attacker typologies and
taxonomies suer from a range of limitations and shortcomings at
this point in time, with [7] concluding on “a disheartening picture of
state-of-the-art thinking on threat actor typologies” after their ini-
tial literature review. For them, problems are mostly methodological,
with used data sources, classication and construction methods not
adequately accounted for. In our opinion, many taxonomies seem
to be build on each other, reference previous literature rather than
using independent real-life datasets (e.g. [18][10]), with one of the
key references in the area [23] not meeting certain standards (clear
publication date and route, named data sources and methodology).
Additionally, we would like to add the lack of justication, rationale
and purpose for many typologies and taxonomies: it is largely un-
clear how these can be used in e.g. threat modelling processes, what
their practical benets are for designing security countermeasures
in organisations and lastly, how they can be validated.
In this paper, we propose the experimental construction of a
new attacker typology grounded in data, using grounded theory
analysis of over 200 publicly available documents containing details
of digital banking related cybercrime and involved attackers. This
is supported by a brief investigation into the mechanisms of the
construction of previous taxonomies and typologies. Eight attacker
proles forming the typology specic to the case of digital banking
are presented, followed by a brief note on potential improvements
to this study and general future directions of research in this eld.
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2 BACKGROUND
To help prepare the construction of the attacker taxonomy for
digital banking as presented in the remainder of this document, this
background section will present strategies for building taxonomies
previously used by others as well as common classication criteria
and attacker types in existing taxonomies or typologies. Initially,
a note on the terminology used in this research area is provided,
with particular focus on the distinction between the concept of a
taxonomy or typology.
2.1 Common terminology in the eld
Attacker categorisations in literature use a number of terms for their
various elements, starting with diering labels for the classied
subjects. Many older categorisations [16][11] and the ones building
closely on [24] use the term ‘hacker’ (e.g. [25][10] or ‘cracker’ in
[14]), while newer propositions use more abstract terms such as
cyber adversaries [18], threat agents [13] or actors [7]. Similarly, we
suggest the usage of the neutral, all-encompassing term ‘attacker’.
Secondly, there seems to be a split between the usage of the terms
typology and taxonomy to describe the classication framework,
with little reection on why one was chosen over the other. While
categorisations referring to [24] have maintained the usage of ‘tax-
onomy’ (e.g. [18][10]), latest eorts have reected more criticially
on this and suggested the use of ‘typology’ as more tting. The two
terms can be clearly distinguished, with [22] stating that “concep-
tually developed congurations are dened as typologies, while
empirically derived congurations are dened as taxonomies”. [25]
support this by viewing taxonomies as categorising “dimensions
based on empirical observation and measurable traits”. In direct
contrast, typologies which can be viewed as a non-exhaustive, “con-
ceptually derived interrelated sets of ideal types” [7] p.9).
For the purpose of the introduced categorisation of digital bank-
ing attackers, we suggest the adoption of the term ‘typology’ fol-
lowing the reasoning that the categorisation is likely to be non-
exhaustive and present ideal summaries of attacker groups rather
than present truly empirical, in-depth and formally measurable
attacker characteristics from a complete, nite dataset.
2.2 Previously used construction strategies
How have attacker categorisations then be built in the past? Early
categorisation eorts have often used personal observations from
a professional context (like in [9] or [14]), but also relied, consoli-
dated and extended strongly on previous literature [24][18]. Even
newer categorisations like [10] and [25] have not introduced new
data to the area, but used existing web resources to review the
previously employed terminology. Similarly, [25] uses literature
to explain the shift in emphasis for their typology to more ideo-
logically and socially motivated attackers. [7] have introduced a
systematic hybrid approach, using both a deductive approach based
on a literature review and an inductive approach, e.g. through re-
viewing data on cyber incidents and monitoring of ongoing attacks.
Several advantages can be identied for following such an approach,
like the identication of new and emerging threats and attackers
as well as the removal of potential bias or methodological issues
from previous studies.
For the proposal in this paper, a similar approach is suggested
in Section 3, with an initial literature review (limited in the context
of this short paper) followed by the analysis of a dataset on digital
banking related incidents to build the categorisation.
2.3 Previously used categorisation criteria
Taxonomies aiming to label and categorise hackers and cybercrime
attackers should take a certain perspective to identify variations
within the entire population. One or multiple criteria are used as a
lens to distinguish attackers characteristics and behaviours and to
help build clusters of similar attackers which can be viewed as an
attacker group or type.
Motivation (also under motives, drivers and intents) and re-
sources (alternatively labelled as skills) can seen as major two crite-
ria for past attacker categorisation [24][16][27][15][18][10][17][25].
Motivations may be of nancial nature or based on revenge, cu-
riosity or notoriety, but can also be found in cause and ideology.
Resources or skills may refer to factors such as time and nances
available to the attacker, technical skill and capabilities of the attack-
ers, but also fewer tangible features such as initial access options
or insider knowledge and personal connections available to the
attacker.
Less frequently used criteria for classications include for exam-
ple the level of danger posed by an attacker or amount of damage
caused to a specic system, group of users or individual users (e.g.
in [5][2][11]). The methods employed to attack a system (‘modus
operandi’) can also be used as classication criterion — [10] employ
a set of threat properties in their taxonomy which includes this
dimension, a view supported in [5] and [2]. Other observed criteria
include moral value and judgement [26], ethical development and
maturity [9], own traceability [27] as well as the attacker’s attitude
to risk [20]. Group structures and aiations may also be part of an
attacker taxonomy [20][15].
2.4 Common attacker types
Similar to the exercise undertaken in [18], this section presents a
heavily consolidated view of common attacker types across pre-
vious taxonomies and typologies. This overview should be seen
as a non-exhaustive, high level indication of the range of existing
attacker types found in literature.
Novices — Attackers with limited technical skills and other
resources motivated by curiosity and thrill seeking can be found in
most categorisations (e.g. in [16][23][24][25][10][3][5][2]).
Browsers & cyber punks — Attackers with low to moderate
skill levels, funds and resources make up this group — their motiva-
tions however may slightly dier, from ‘students’ viewing breaking
into and studying a system as an intellectual challenge [16][11]
to ‘cyber-punks’ or ‘pranksters’ (e.g. in [23][25][18] describing at-
tackers motivated by thrill seeking and possibly revenge, but also
personal gain (through minor fraud activities).
Ethical hackers — Relatively consistent and well-dened clus-
ter across several categorisations (e.g. in [5][23][24][17][10][25][18])
— highly skilled individuals dened through their intact moral code,
ethics and ideology driven by passion and intellectual challenge, but
with no regular criminal intent (although potentially a certain level
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of disrespect for rules and authority). These attackers may cooper-
ate with the system owner to help mitigate found vulnerabilities
(e.g. through bug bounty or responsible disclosure programmes).
Insiders — Attackers with insider knowledge or access to a
system, referred to as ‘internals’ or ‘insiders’ form this group, moti-
vated by revenge or nancial gain and will engage in e.g. sabotage,
theft of intellectual property and fraud against their (ex-)employer
(for example in [23][24][10][25][5]).
Hacktivists — The term ‘hacktivists’ [10][25][2] is based on the
original terms ‘cyber terrorists’ and ‘political activists’ proposed in
[23][24] and also supported by [18]. It refers to groups of attackers
engaging in attacks with a political or social background, motivated
by ideology, cause and potentially the search for fame.
Crackers & coders — This cluster consists of a number of dif-
ferent attacker types, including attacker types with labels such as
‘crackers’ [11][5]), but also ‘virus writers’ [9]) as well as ‘elite hack-
ers’ and ‘black hats’ [17][3]. While these attacker types may vary
regarding their level of technical skills and resources in terms of
funding and equipment, they can generally be considered as very
capable and knowledgeable individuals with a high potential for
destruction. This group is also united by common motives behind
their attacks: they will hack to feed their ego and for entertainment,
but also to gain a certain reputation and status within their peer
group.
Professional criminals — Professional criminals can be found
across many categorisations, e.g. [16][23][24][10][25][2][18][5].
This group is dened by its criminal background and profession-
alism, motivated by the prospect of large nancial gains. They
are likely to be part of larger structures in the form of organised
criminal gangs, giving them access to signicant resources such as
funding and technical skills also through employing highly skilled
individuals to write customised malware for their attacks.
Government agents — Also described by the term ‘nation
states’ [2][10] or ‘foreign intelligence’ [24], state-sponsored attack-
ers form the ‘government agents’ cluster. These highly skilled at-
tackers are employed by government agencies for the espionage,
counterespionage and information monitoring of governments,
individuals, terrorist groups and critical infrastructure providers
(gas, electricity or water) as well as the nancial or defence sectors
[5]. Attackers in this cluster will have access to a vast amount of
knowledge and funding due to their backing from government or
government related institutions. Their appearance, general nature,
targets and modus operandi may vary greatly.
Other attacker types — While the clusters derived from var-
ious attacker categorisations outlined in the last sections do not
deviate signicantly from other consolidated overviews on the mat-
ter (compare to [18]), there are other attacker types not covered in
this summary. This is generally the case for attacker types which
have not been introduced in more than one of categorisations re-
viewed. An example is the case of the ‘crowdsourcer’ attacker type
newly proposed in [25] — it describes large scale human collabo-
ration to obtain often condential information, potentially using
illegal means.
3 METHODOLOGY
This section presents a short overview on the employed method-
ology and data sources used to arrive at the proposed typology in
Section 4. As no previous treatment for the case of digital banking
appears to exist, this paper seeks to address the following research
questions: what are the most common attacker types targeting digi-
tal banking systems? Which criteria are best used to describe these
attackers types? Which attacker characteristics and behaviours are
best used to inform these criteria?
3.1 Data sources
The underlying data used to inform the categorisation consists of
over 200 freely available documents containing information about
digital banking fraud cases and the attackers involved [1][12][8].
These data sources consist of news reports of digital banking attacks
also containing information on the attackers as well as prole
description of cybercriminals. The datasets used where chosen for
their public availability, level of detail and specic relevance to
digital banking. However, similar datasets containing information
on such incidents could be added, like for example from the VERIS
database or industry-specic shared data.
3.2 Taxonomy building process
In preparation for the taxonomy building process, the described
dataset was analysed using grounded theory analytical steps. This
method was chosen for its exploratory nature and ability to con-
struct theory [4]. In contrast to solely relying on literature, the aim
was to use the here discovered attacker characteristics to help build
the classication criteria and ultimately the attacker proles.
The initial grounded theory coding process yielded two ax-
ial codes (personal characteristics and social interactions; attack-
related behaviours) and six main categories (personal characteris-
tics, community, geography; modus operandi, targets, relationship
with law enforcement) containing a large number of codes which
further break down these categories. Through comparison to the
criteria used to build other taxonomies (see Section 2.3) a number
of these subordinate codes were selected as potentially useful for
building the new taxonomy.
While all of these codes already had a number of text excerpts
describing attacker characteristics and behaviour associated with
them, a third round of coding (initial and subsequently structural
coding) was carried out to make sure all the information in the data
sample was captured in a structured way. All variations found under
the conceptual phrases or codes was now collated and logically
clustered together where possible. Attacker categories were re-
grouped, merged or separated as often as required. Categorisation
and re-ordering was nished when all variations where accounted
for and did not present any new clues for further categorisations
or changes — for this study and its underlying dataset, theoretical
saturation (dened in [4] p.345 or [6] p.194) had been reached at
this point in time.
The results of this exercise are presented in the next section.
In the spirit of grounded theory research, the proposed taxonomy
should be treated as an initial step — notes on current limitations,
viable verication eorts and potential further research can be
found in Section 5.
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4 RESULTS
Table 1: System challengers
Subgroups System testers, fun/challenge seekers
Labels White hat or ethical hackers, thrill seekers or
glory hunters, young or novice hackers
Motives Fun of hacking, bragging rights, challenge to
break into system, exposing vulnerabilities (re-
sponsible disclosure)
Criminal
intent
Low to moderate
Resources Range of skills and funds, can be limited
Activities System intrusion, penetration testing, publica-
tion of vulnerabilities
Level of
danger posed
Relatively low, but varies across the group and
can be seen as an entry into serious criminality
for some
Type of risk
posed
Often reputational risk, may however also be of
nancial or operational nature
Other notes or
comments
Very heterogeneous group united by desire to
overcome challenge posed by overcoming the
system’s defence.
Table 2: Supporters
Subgroups Money mules, non-technical support functions
Labels Non-technical support functions: mules, cash
collectors, business functions such as recruit-
ment, marketing or customer service
Motives Financial gain, ‘making ends meet’
Criminal
intent
Moderate to high (in some cases unwittingly)
Resources Limited technical skill levels and funding
Activities Supporting a larger group or system through all
stages of money laundering and other business
support functions
Level of
danger posed
Low on their own, but part of a group or system
Type of risk
posed
Usually nancial risk, although operational and
reputational risk may be indirectly posed
Other notes or
comments
Supporters are not technically attackers them-
selves, but support others to commit crimes
Table 3: Insiders
Labels Banking employees, employees of third-party
suppliers
Motives Financial gain, retaliation
Criminal
intent
Moderate to high
Resources Range of skills and funds, enabled through in-
sider knowledge and capabilities including ele-
vated access rights
Activities Usage of insider knowledge to extract money
directly (or enable others), system destruction,
industrial espionage
Level of
danger posed
High, signicant levels of damage possible
Type of risk
posed
Often nancial, but also signicant potential
for operational (IT sabotage) and potentially
reputational risk
Table 4: Ideologists
Labels Hacktivists, online activists or cyber terrorists
Motives Cause, ideology, in rare cases also status and
ego (secondary motives such as nancial gains
may be present)
Criminal
intent
Moderate to high
Resources Moderate to high skill levels and funding
Activities Social or political background to attacks
Level of
danger posed
High, signicant levels of damage and destruc-
tion intended
Type of risk
posed
Reputational risk and linked operational risk,
nancial risk as a secondary motive
Other notes or
comments
Ideologists are usually motivated by cause and
ideology, but examples of attackers being moti-
vated by selsh reasons such as nancial gain
or simply to engage in petty vandalism can be
found, for example for subgroups of Anony-
mous
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Table 5: Ocials
Labels Nation states, sovereign countries, government
or its agencies, military functions
Motives Cause, ideology, cyber warfare
Criminal
intent
High
Resources Very high skill levels and funding
Activities Espionage, counterespionage, information mon-
itoring and destructive attacks, cyber warfare
Level of
danger posed
High, although limited evidence and conrmed
cases to date
Type of risk
posed
Operational risk as a main focus with reputa-
tional and nancial risk directly linked
Other notes or
comments
Not much is known about this group and ref-
erences in the data sample are sparse — these
attacker types like to remain undetected.
Table 6: Professionals I: groups and gangs
Labels Sophisticated large criminal groups or gangs
and organised online crime syndicates, also
termed as cyber maa (members often profes-
sionally recruited)
Motives Financial gain
Criminal
intent
High
Resources High skill levels and funding: broad range of
skills and resources available through group
setup
Activities Phishing, ransomware, trojans and malware at-
tacks as well as system intrusion at large scale,
physical attacks e.g. against cash machines also
possible. May also oer their services through
criminal-to-criminal franchise models.
Level of
danger posed
High, signicant levels of damage
Type of risk
posed
Financial, operational and reputational risk di-
rectly linked
Other notes or
comments
Primary/key category for digital banking attack-
ers. These attackers should be viewed as highly
professional criminals.
Table 7: Professionals II: Small Groups and Individuals
Labels Lone hackers and individual attackers, small
criminal groups and gangs (can be relatives or
friends rather than recruited)
Motives Financial gain
Criminal
intent
High
Resources Moderate to high skill levels and funding
Activities Phishing, ransomware, trojans and malware at-
tacks as well as system intrusion at large scale,
physical attacks. Similar to professionals I, but
usually at smaller scale.
Level of
danger posed
Medium to high
Type of risk
posed
Financial, operational and reputational risk di-
rectly linked
Other notes or
comments
Primary/key category for digital banking attack-
ers. Again, these attackers should be viewed as
professional criminals, and not underestimated.
Table 8: Toolkit users
Labels Users of attack toolkits (also called crime-
in-a-box, exploit or crimeware kits), clients
of criminal-to-criminal services (also named
crimeware-as-a-service)
Motives Financial gain, ‘making ends meet’
Criminal
intent
High
Resources Limited skills and funds (relying on toolkits),
although more experienced attackers may use
them for convenience and scalability too
Activities Phishing, ransomware, trojans and malware at-
tacks through usage of toolkits and services
available through criminal-to-criminal fran-
chises.
Level of
danger posed
Medium to high
Type of risk
posed
Financial risk, operational and reputational risk
directly linked
Other notes or
comments
Primary/key category for digital banking attack-
ers. There may be overlaps between the former
categories (professionals I and II), but the em-
phasis for toolkit users is on their reliance on
crimeware toolkits to launch attacks and com-
mit crimes.
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5 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
There are several initial insights from the presentation of the results
and the included eight attacker proles specic to digital banking.
Firstly, it seems entirely possible to build a new industry or appli-
cation specic attacker typology or taxonomy. Furthermore, it is
indicated that real-world data, even of secondary nature, can help
to build such categorisations, providing a new perspective over
categorisation solely based on previous literature.
For the specic case of digital banking, a number of new and
interesting categories have emerged that have not been part of
previous, more generic taxonomies. The supporters category is
certainly interesting as a non-technical category — while technical
mitigations may not strictly be required, banks may for example
want to consider how they can deter individuals from becoming
money mules or other crime supporters. The professional criminals
category found in most previous categorisations has been further
examined and split into three sub-categories in our proposal — this
seems adequate as digital banking services could be assumed to be
a particular focus of various types of professional criminals. This as-
pect again could help banks to re-think their perspective on human
adversaries and threat agents and further tailor their defences to
specic attacker groups. Lastly, the presence of attackers not driven
by prot (e.g. ideologists) is also highlighted in the presented typol-
ogy. Additionally, reputational risk has found inclusion into this
typology — this seems particular relevant to nancial institutions
with their business model largely building on trust.
However, not unsimilar to previous taxonomy eorts, this initial
eort leaves open several questions and challenges in this research
space. Firstly, while the presented typology is grounded in real-life
data, verication using further data or against similar studies has
not been attempted. Similarly to previous taxonomies, the practical
value and impact of the introduced typology has not been dened
at this point in time. Further options for extension and integration
into existing risk assessment methods and tools or threat modelling
approaches have not been considered in this short paper. Lastly,
due to the limited scope of this publication, several aspects have
only been touched upon briey, like the terminology or grounded
theory element of this study, which should both be expanded on.
In direct relation to the last paragraph, the following future re-
search directions are suggested at this point in time: rstly, the
addition of new datasets to re-run the typology construction and
tests its validity and robustness. Relating back and further compar-
ing the new typology to previous research in this area may help to
learn more about the research eld in general and to produce further
guidance on typology/taxonomy construction methods. Expansion
on certain aspects also seems worthwhile, including research on in-
tegration points for such categorisations. This could also be helped
by working with practitioners and gaining insights into their view
on categorisations and their potential practical value.
In summary, as an initial starting point for a typology built ‘from
the ground up’ , the results produced certainly seem encouraging.
It will now be of interest to keep this typology up to date, discuss
it with other researchers and practitioners and to feedback on the
learnings so they can be integrated in future eorts in this eld.
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